We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good pure-credit economy with limited commitment, similar to Sanches and Williamson (2010) and Gu et al. (2013b) , under both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity and a continuum of sunspot equilibria, irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism. We uncover empirically relevant equilibria that do not emerge under "not-too-tight constraints" such as those in which credit limits grow endogenously over time and those in which credit shuts down periodically. Moreover, we provide examples of credit cycles that dominate all equilibria with "not-too-tight" solvency constraints.
Introduction
The inability of individuals to commit to honor their future obligations is a key friction of decentralized economies that jeopardizes the Arrow-Debreu apparatus based on promises to deliver goods at di¤erent dates and in di¤erent states. Stark examples are pure currency economies where anonymity and lack of commitment make credit infeasible. Arguably, pure currency economies have become less relevant due to advances in record-keeping technologies that facilitate the use of credit. Yet, monitoring technologies do not purge economies from the limited commitment problem-they do not make individuals entirely trustworthy.
Recent contributions in the New Monetarist literature emphasize the existence of multiple equilibria in economies with limited commitment. Sanches and Williamson (2010) prove the existence of two steady states, one with a positive level of credit and one with a complete credit shut-down. Gu et al. (2013b) , GMMW thereafter, generalize this …nding by showing the existence of periodic equilibria for some trading mechanisms.
A noticeable implication of their theory is that cycles are more prevalent in pure monetary economies than in pure credit economies. Both papers follow Alvarez and Jermann, (2000) , AJ thereafter, and impose "not-tootight"solvency constraints according to which in every period agents can issue the maximum amount of debt that is incentive-compatible with no default. Such constraints, however, arbitrarily restrict the equilibrium set. AJ rationalize them by showing that they implement constrained-e¢ cient allocations for their pure exchange, one-good economy. But there is no presumption that such rationale holds for a production economy with two-goods, such as the New Monetarist environment. Hence, instead of imposing arbitrary solvency constraints, the objective of this paper is to give a complete game-theoretic characterization of the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium set of a New-Monetarist pure credit economy. 1 The economy features random matching-in pairwise meetings or in large groups-and incorporates intertemporal gains from trade that can be exploited with one-period debt contracts. In the absence of public record keeping, the environment corresponds to the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005) so that one can easily compare equilibrium allocations in credit and monetary economies. In the presence of a public record-keeping technology the environment is borrowed from the one in GMMW. 2 We start with a simple mechanism where the borrower in each bilateral match sets the terms of the loan contract unilaterally, which allows us to analyze the economy as a standard in…nitely-repeated game with imperfect monitoring. If we impose the AJ "not-too-tight"solvency constraints exogenously-which amounts 1 In Wicksell's (1936) words about pure credit economies, "a thorough analysis of this purely imaginary case seems to me to be worth while, for it provides a precise antithesis to the equally imaginary case of a pure cash system, in which credit plays no part whatever." 2 As we discuss later in details, there are di¤erences regarding the timing of production that are inconsequential. While the competitive version of our model is closely related to AJ, it di¤ers in important ways, including preferences over two goods.
to restricting strategies and beliefs such that any form of default is punished with permanent autarky-then there is a unique active steady-state equilibrium and a continuum of equilibria with decreasing output levels, but no equilibrium with endogenous cycles. The set of all perfect Bayesian equilibria is much bigger. It contains a continuum of steady-state equilibria and a continuum of periodic equilibria of any periodicity.
Each equilibrium can be reduced to a sequence of debt limits, where the debt limit in a period speci…es the amount that agents can be trusted to repay. These results are robust to the choice of the mechanism to determine the terms of the loan contract-Nash or proportional bargaining, or even competitive pricing if agents meet in large groups.
We construct the set of all equilibrium outcomes by using simple automata. Simple strategies specify that borrowers always repay up to some endogenous limit in order to remain in good standing with future lenders. If an agent's debt is larger than this limit (an out-of-equilibrium event), they default partially, whereas if their debt is lower than the limit, they repay in full. Lenders accept all loan contracts that specify principals that are consistent with full repayment. We prove that these simple strategies form a PBE and that all equilibrium outcomes can be obtained from such strategies.
Why is this larger set of credit equilibria relevant? First, it is important to characterize the full set of equilibrium of a pure credit economy based on the standard equilibrium notion (essentially, subgame perfection) used in monetary theory and repeated games. By imposing arbitrary "not-too-tight" solvency constraints the literature has focused on a narrow set of equilibrium outcomes of measure zero in the set of all equilibria. However, the large multiplicity of equilibria does not imply that everything goes. Fundamentals, including preferences and market structure, do matter for an outcome to be consistent with an equilibrium.
We show that the set of credit-cycle equilibria expands as trading frictions are reduced, agents are more patient, and borrowers have more bargaining power (in the version of the model with bargaining).
Second, focusing on equilibria supported by "not-too-tight" solvency constraints set cannot be justi…ed by standard re…nements. 3 These equilibria do not have better normative properties; we provide examples where there are a continuum of equilibria that dominate from a social welfare point of view the best equilibrium under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints. 4 Additionally, all our equilibrium outcomes correspond to outcomes of equilibria that are weakly renegotiation-proof.
Finally, by considering the full set of equilibria, we uncover equilibria that are consistent with empirical evidence. We show there are equilibria featuring a secular growth of unsecured credit, with monotone-increasing debt limits as seen in the US after 1980. There are equilibria featuring periodic credit booms and busts where credit completely dries up and recovers later on. There are asymmetric equilibria with rich distributions of debt limits across agents. From a theory standpoint, "not-too-tight" constraints exclude outcomes of the pure monetary economy (with …at money but no record keeping) even though they form a strict subset of the outcomes of the pure credit economy (with record keeping but no …at money). So the result according to which cycles should be less prevalent in pure credit economies is the direct consequence of the imposition of "not-too-tight"solvency constraints. Indeed, all dynamic allocations of monetary economies (e.g., cycles, chaos) are also outcomes in PBE of pure credit economies.
Related literature
We adopt an environment similar to the pure currency economy of Lagos and Wright (2005) states and of GMMW which focuses on cycles. In both cases, the equilibrium notion considered imposes the "not-too-tight" solvency constraints of AJ. Instead, we present our model as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring with few restrictions on strategies and beliefs (the same restrictions typically imposed on equilibria of pure currency economies). 5 In addition, we consider both stationary and non-stationary equilibria (including endogenous cycles and sunspots), and various trading mechanisms (ultimatum games, axiomatic bargaining solutions, competitive pricing). Our methods to characterize equilibrium outcomes are related but di¤er from the ones used by Abreu (1988) and Abreu et al. (1990) as our stage game has an extensive form and only buyers/borrowers are (imperfectly) monitored. Kocherlakota (1998) shows that the set of implementable outcomes of monetary economies is a subset of the implementable outcomes of pure credit economies. 6 We …nd a similar result, but in contrast to Kocherlakota, we take the trading mechanism as given and we do not restrict outcomes to stationary ones.
Our paper is part of the literature on limited commitment in macroeconomics. Seminal contributions on risk sharing in endowment economies where agents lack commitment include Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) , and AJ. Kocherlakota (1996) adopts a mechanism design approach in a two-agent economy with a single good. In contrast we study a two-good production economy where a continuum of agents search for new partners every period. 5 Repeated games where agents are matched bilaterally and at random and change trading partners over time are studied in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) . A thorough review of the literature is provided by Mailath and Samuelson (2006) . 6 Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) study an environment similar to AJ and show that the set of equilibrium allocations with self-enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with money.
Description of the game
Time is discrete and starts with period 0. Each date has two stages. The …rst stage will be referred to as the DM (decentralized market) while the second stage will be referred to as the CM (centralized market).
There is a single, perishable good at each stage and the CM good will be taken as the numéraire. There is a continuum of agents of measure two divided evenly into a subset of buyers, B, and a subset of sellers, S. 7 The labels "buyer" and "seller" refer to agents'roles in the DM: only the sellers can produce the DM good (and hence will be lenders) and only the buyers desire DM goods (and hence will be borrowers). In the DM, a fraction 2 (0; 1] of buyers meet with sellers in pairs. (We consider a version of the model with large meetings later.) The CM will be the stage where agents settle debts.
Preferences are additively separable over dates and stages. The DM utility of a seller who produces y 2 R + is v(y), while that of a buyer who consumes y is u(y), where v(0) = u(0) = 0, v and u are strictly increasing and di¤erentiable with v convex and u strictly concave, and u
We denote by y = arg max [u(y) v(y)] > 0 the quantity that maximizes the match surplus. The utility of consuming z 2 R units of the numéraire good is z, where z < 0 is interpreted as production. 8 Agents'common discount factor across periods is 1=(1 + r) 2 (0; 1).
With no loss in generality, we restrict our attention to intra-period loans issued in the DM and repaid in the subsequent CM. 9 The terms of the loan contracts are determined according to a simple protocol whereby buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to sellers. We describe alternative mechanisms later in the paper. Agents cannot commit to future actions. Therefore, the repayment of loans in the CM has to be self-enforcing.
There is a technology allowing loan contracts in the DM and repayments in the CM to be publicly recorded. The entry in the public record for each loan is a triple, (`; x; i), composed of the size of the loan negotiated in the DM in terms of the numéraire good,`2 R + , the amount repaid in the CM, x 2 R + , and the identity of the buyer, i 2 B. If no credit is issued in a pairwise meeting, or if i was unmatched, the entry in the public record is (0; 0; i). The record is updated at the end of each period t as follows: 7 The assumption of ex-ante heterogeneity among agents is borrowed from Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Alternatively, one could assume that an agent's role in the DM is determined at random in every period without a¤ecting any of our results. 8 Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ consider pure exchange economies. One could reinterpret our economy as an endowment economy as follows. Suppose that sellers receive an endowment y in the DM and z in the CM. Buyers have no endowment in the DM but an endowment z in the CM. The DM utility of the seller is w(c) where w is a concave function with w 0 ( y) = 0. Hence, the opportunity cost to the seller of giving up y units of consumption is v(y) = w( y) w( y y). 9 Under linear payo¤s in the CM one-period debt contracts are optimal, i.e., agents have no incentives to smooth the repayment of debt across multiple periods. This assumption will facilitate the comparison with pure monetary economies of the type studied in Lagos and Wright (2005) . A few remarks are in order about these conditions. Our record-keeping technology does not record all actions taken by the agents. Agents have private information about the number of matches they had, quantities they consumed, or o¤ers that were rejected. Because of this private information using perfect Bayesian equilibrium 1 0 We could make alternative assumptions regarding what is recorded in a match. For instance, the technology could also record the output level, y, together with the promises made by the buyer, i.e., i = (y;`; x; i). Not surprisingly, this would expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, we could assume that the seller only observes the record of the buyer he is matched with, i , without a¤ecting our results. (PBE) as the solution concept is both standard and necessary. Alternatively, one may assume that all actions are observable, and PBE is reduced to subgame perfection. Although we prefer our environment, which is closer to the existing literature on monetary economics, our multiplicity result does not rely on the presence of private information. In fact, because of our focus on public strategies, (A1), any PBE we construct is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if all actions were observable. 12 However, agents' beliefs about how other agents will respond to deviations do matter but they are pinned down by equilibrium strategies.
Conditions (A1) and (A2) imply that, for any credit equilibrium, its outcomes are characterized by f(y t ;`t)g +1 t=0 , the sequence of equilibrium o¤ers made by buyers. Moreover, (A3) implies that x t =`t for each t, and hence the sequence f(y t ;`t)g +1 t=0 also determines the equilibrium allocation. Without (A1), equilibrium o¤ers may depend on the buyer's past matching histories. 13 Condition (A3) is not vacuous either. It restricts sellers to believe that buyers will repay their debt when observing a deviating o¤er with obligations smaller than those in equilibrium.
14 This restriction will rule out ine¢ ciently large trades. As we will see later, taken together the restrictions (A1)-(A3) will allow us to obtain a simple representation of credit equilibria with solvency constraints added to the bargaining problem.
Let f(y t ;`t)g +1 t=0 be a sequence of equilibrium o¤ers. Along the equilibrium path the lifetime expected discounted utility of a buyer at the beginning of period t is
In each period t + s the buyer is matched with a seller with probability in which case the buyer asks for y t+s units of DM output in exchange for a repayment of`t +s units of the numéraire in the following CM and the seller agrees. In any equilibrium `t + V b t+1
0, which simply says that a buyer must be better o¤ repaying his debt and going along with the equilibrium rather than defaulting on his debt and o¤ering no-trade in all future matches, (y t+s ;`t +s ) = (0; 0) for all s > 0. By a similar reasoning the lifetime expected utility of a seller along the equilibrium path is
The seller's participation constraint in the DM requires v(y t ) +`t 0 since a seller can reject a trade without fear of retribution (since he is not monitored.) Given that buyers set the terms of trade unilaterally, and the output level is not part of the record i , this participation constraint holds at equality. Our …rst proposition builds on these observations to characterize outcomes of credit equilibria.
, is a credit equilibrium outcome if and only if, for each t = 0; 1; :::,`t
As mentioned earlier, a sequence of equilibrium o¤ers, f(y t ;`t)g +1 t=0 , also determines the sequence of
, with x t =`t for each t, and hence, Proposition 1 also gives a characterization of allocations that can be sustained in a credit equilibrium. Condition (4), which follows directly from (2) and
0, is analogous to the participation constraint (IR) in Kehoe and Levine (1993) , and the participation constraint in Proposition 2.1 in Kocherlakota (1996) . However, while
Kehoe and Levine assume the IR constraint from the outset as a primitive condition, (4) is derived as an equilibrium condition in our framework. The condition (5) is the outcome of the buyer take-it-or-leave-it o¤er and pairwise Pareto e¢ ciency (which follows from the threshold rule A3). 15 Proposition 1 shows that the conditions (4)- (5) are not only necessary but also su¢ cient for an equilibrium by constructing a simple equilibrium strategy pro…le. This strategy pro…le relies on punishments-the "penal code" in Abreu's (1988) terminology-for both default and excessive lending. 16 Speci…cally, buyers can be in two states at the beginning of period t, i;t 2 fG; Ag, where G means "good standing" and A means "autarky" and each buyer's initial state is i;0 = G. The law of motion of a buyer i's state following a loan and repayment (~;x) is given by:
where (~;x) might di¤er from the loan and repayment along the equilibrium path,`t = x t . In order to remain in good standing, or state G, the buyer must repay his loan,x ~, if the size of the loan is no greater than the equilibrium loan size,~ `t, and he must repay the equilibrium loan size,x `t, otherwise. 17 The autarky state, A, is absorbing: once a buyer becomes untrustworthy, he stays untrustworthy forever. Sellers cannot be punished in future periods for accepting a loan larger than`t since their identity is not recorded.
However, they are punished in the current period because buyers are allowed to partially default on loans larger than`t while keeping their good standing with future lenders. Figure 1 where (y t ;`t) is the o¤er made by a buyer in state G along the equilibrium path and (ỹ;~) is any o¤er. By the one-stage-deviation principle it is then straightforward to show that any f(y t ;`t)g 1 t=0 that satis…es (4)- (5) is an outcome for the strategy pro…le (s b ; s s ).
DM offer DM offer
Buyer's state: G Buyer's state: A
Accept and repay

Any action
Reject or Accept and repay In the following we propose an alternative formulation of a credit equilibrium in terms of solvency constraints imposed on the bargaining problems in the DM. As in AJ in the context of an economy with competitive trades, a solvency constraint speci…es an upper bound-called a debt limit-on the quantity of debt an agent can issue,` d t . According to this formulation, the buyer in a DM match sets the terms of the loan contract so as to maximize his surplus, u(y) `, subject to the seller's participation constraint and the solvency (or borrowing) constraint,` d t , i.e.,
The solution to (7) is`t = (y t ) where
The solvency constraint is reminiscent to the feasibility constraint in monetary models (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005) according to which buyers in bilateral matches cannot spend more than their real balances.
We say that a sequence of debt limits, fd t g 1 t=0 , is consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome, f(y t ; x t ;`t)g
if (y t ;`t) is a solution to the bargaining problem, (7), given d t for all t 2 N 0 , and the buyer's CM strategy consists of repaying his debt up to d t provided that his past public histories (up to period t 1) are consistent with equilibrium behavior, that is, the sequence fd t g satis…es condition (A3).
It is easy to check from the proof of Proposition 1 that any credit equilibrium outcome, f(y t ; x t ;`t)g
is consistent with the sequence of debt limits, fd t g 1 t=0 , such that d t =`t for all t 2 N 0 . But the same equilibrium outcome may be implementable by multiple debt limits if (9) is slack and y t = y . The following corollary summarizes these results and reduces a credit equilibrium to a sequence of debt limits,
that satis…es a sequence of participation constraints.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium representation with debt limits) A sequence of debt limits, fd t g 1 t=0 , is consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome if and only if
Corollary 1 gives a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes using debt limits. Indeed, by (10), y t is determined by d t , and hence (9) can be viewed as an inequality that involves fd t g 1 t=0 as the only endogenous variables. Without the danger of confusion, we also call a sequence of debt limits, fd t g 1 t=0 , a credit equilibrium if it satis…es (9) and (10). The next Corollary provides a su¢ cient condition for a credit equilibrium in recursive form.
Corollary 2 (Recursive su¢ cient condition) Any bounded sequence,
where v(y t ) = minfd t ; v(y )g, is a credit equilibrium.
The left side of (11) is the cost of repaying the current debt limit while the right side of (11) is the bene…t which has two components: the expected match surplus of a buyer who has access to credit and his continuation value given by the debt limit next-period. We represent the right side of (11) by the red curve in Figure 2 . Any fd t g located above this curve is a credit equilibrium.
The following proposition characterizes all equilibria with "not-too-tight" solvency constraints, meaning d t is the largest debt limit that solves the buyer's CM participation constraint, (9), at equality. Graphically, 
Proposition 2 (Symmetric Equilibria under "not-too-tight" constraints.) There are three types of symmetric equilibria under "not-too-tight" solvency constraint:
and fd t g is strictly monotone decreasing.
The restriction to "not-too-tight" solvency constraints does not narrow down the equilibrium set to a good competitive economy, there is a also a continuum of non-stationary equilibria where the initial debt limit is between 0 and d max and the debt limit falls over time. 18 However, there are no equilibria with cycles or ‡uctuations, in contrast to equilibrium outcomes of pure monetary economies (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2003 ).
Renegotiation proofness
We show in this section that all the credit equilibrium outcomes we constructed are also outcomes of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria (Farrell and Maskin, 1989) . A WRP equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium where any two continuation payo¤s are not Pareto-rankable. Intuitively, if there were such Paretodominated equilibrium in any subgame, it seems at some heuristic level that agents should be able to renegotiate and coordinate on the continuation equilibrium that Pareto dominates. Since WRP is formulated for games with perfect information and with two players, to apply this concept, we consider a two-player version of our game, but as we explain later the concepts can be carried over to the general environment. In this version, there is only one buyer and one seller, and they meet at each period with probability . Note that, however, all credit equilibria remain SPE in this two-player version. Finally, since we have two stages at each period, we apply the requirement of WRP to the continuation values at the beginning of the DM's.
Consider a stationary credit equilibrium with debt limit d and DM output, y. In our constructed equilibrium strategy, buyers are either in good standing or bad standing with corresponding value functions V b and
With autarky as the punishment (which was part of the construction of an equilibrium ),V b = 0. In good standing, the continuation value of the buyer at the beginning of DM is
and the continuation value of the seller is V s = 0 since repayment is x = v(y). The repayment constraint is
Recall that we use this simple strategy to recover all equilibrium outcomes. However, this simple equilibrium 
and henceV b = 0. This also implies the buyer is weakly better o¤ making the o¤er (0; d) than any other o¤er (which will be either rejected or has higher repayment). The seller is also willing to accept the o¤er. In this proposed equilibrium, no two continuation values can be (strictly) Pareto ranked. When in good standing, the seller's continuation value is V s = 0; in bad standing, the seller's continuation value isV
These results can be extended to our benchmark environment with a continuum of agents if we assume perfect monitoring and use the continuation values right after the DM matches are formed to capture the idea that a pair may renegotiate. 19 
Equilibria of special interest
In this section we focus on PBE without imposing "not-too-tight"solvency constraints and show that doing so reveals equilibria that are relevant, both theoretically and empirically. We show there exist a continuum of symmetric steady-state equilibria or a continuum of asymmetric steady-state equilibria in which there exists heterogeneity in credit limits across otherwise observationally equivalent borrowers (Section 5.1). We
show that the set of credit equilibria contains the set of pure monetary equilibria, including non-stationary ones (Section 5.2). We show that credit booms and busts are ubiquitous; there are a continuum of PBE credit cycles of any periodicity, some of which feature credit completely drying up in certain periods (Section 5.3). Finally, we show that PBE can feature endogenous credit growth (Section 5.4) or sunspot equilibria in which credit limits depend on idiosyncratic states, such as an agent's employment status (Section 5.5).
Symmetric and asymmetric steady states
Until now, we have focused on symmetric equilibria based on restrictions (A2) and (A3). Our framework can be easily extended to allow for asymmetric stationary equilibria where each buyer's debt limit is indexed by his identity. In particular, we use F : B ! R + to denote the debt limit assignment for each buyer. Thus, for each buyer, the incentive-compatibility condition, (9), or, equivalently, (11), can be simpli…ed to read:
where z given by (8) indicates the DM level of output as a function of d. there is an asymmetric equilibrium where the distribution of debt limits across buyers is given by F .
Any debt limit between the two values obtained under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints, 0 and d max , is also part of an equilibrium. There are many ways to generate PBE outcomes with d 2 (0; d max ). We can adopt the simple strategies described earlier according to which a buyer remains trustworthy as long as he repays d. Alternatively, one can consider strategies that punish buyers who default by temporary exclusion from trades instead of permanent autarky. Suppose that a buyer in bad standing recovers his good standing with probability at the end of a period. (One could also consider punishment of deterministic length.)
Then, the value of being in bad standing solvesV b = V b +(1 ) V b and the highest debt limit consistent with no default solves
Alternatively, agents who default might bene…t from lower, but positive, debt limits in the future. There are now three states: good standing, bad standing, and autarky. Agents transition from good to bad standing the …rst time they default. If agents default more than once they stay in autarky permanently. The debt limits in good and bad standing, d andd respectively, solve
The debt limitd is sustained by the simple strategies described earlier. Such equilibrium outcomes are in accordance with the evidence (e.g., Jagtiani and Li, 2014) but do not correspond to equilibria with "nottoo-tight" constraints. 
Pure monetary outcomes
Proposition 2 showed that equilibria with "not-too-tight" solvency constraints do not exhibit ‡uctuations.
This …nding is consistent with GMMW according to whom the model must be modi…ed by adding a preference parameter in order to generate cycles (see our Section 6). But it is puzzling given that pure currency economies can generate ‡uctuations and cycles (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2003) and we know from Kocherlakota (1998) that there are equivalence results in terms of implementation between pure currency and pure credit economies. In order to reconcile these di¤erent …ndings we now show that the set of credit equilibrium outcomes contains all equilibrium outcomes of a pure monetary economy, including its non-stationary ones, provided that one does not impose "not-too-tight" constraints. 
where y t+1 = 1 ( t+1 m). A monetary equilibrium is a bounded sequence,
, that solves (13), with v(y t ) = x t = minf t ; v(y )g.
Proposition 4 (Monetary vs Credit Equilibria)
Let f(y t ; x t ; t )g +1 t=0 be a monetary equilibrium of the economy with no record-keeping. Then, f(y t ; x t ;`t)g +1 t=0 where`t = minf t ; v(y )g is a credit equilibrium of the economy with record-keeping.
Given a monetary equilibrium where the value of money is t , one can construct a pure credit equilibrium where buyers are trustworthy to repay t . We illustrate this result in Figure 2 , where the green, backwardbending line represents the …rst-order di¤erence equation for a monetary equilibrium, (13) , while the red area is the …rst-order di¤erence inequality for a credit equilibrium, (11) . Starting from some initial condition, d 0 , we represent by a dashed line a sequence fd t g that satis…es the conditions for a monetary equilibrium.
This sequence also satis…es the conditions for a credit equilibrium, i.e., all pairs (d t ; d t+1 ) are located in the red area. So the existence of equilibria with endogenous ‡uctuations in pure credit economies should not come as a surprise given that equivalent equilibria exist in pure monetary economies. As we will show in the following, the reverse of Proposition 4 does not hold; there are equilibria of pure credit economies that are not equilibria of pure monetary economies.
Credit booms and busts
We now show that credit economies have a much larger set of periodic equilibria than monetary economies and such equilibria can be relevant to explain severe credit crises with large volatility in consumption and investment. For instance, Fulford (2014) document that credit limit volatility is substantially larger than standard estimates of income volatility. 22 We start with 2-period cycles, fd 0 ; d 1 g, where d 0 is the debt limit in even periods and d 1 is the debt limit in odd periods. The incentive-compatibility condition, (9), becomes:
where we used that`t = v(y t ) = minfd t ; v(y )g from (10). The term on the numerator on the right side of (14) is the buyer's expected discounted utility over the 2-period cycle starting in t + 1. We de…ne, for each
the highest debt limit in odd periods consistent with a debt limit equal to d 0 in even periods. A 2-periodcycle equilibrium, or simply a 2-period cycle, is a pair
is positive, non-decreasing, and concave. 23 The function is represented in the two panels of Figure 3 . It is non-decreasing because if the debt limit in even periods increases, then the punishment from defaulting gets larger and, as a consequence, higher debt limits can be sustained in odd periods. So there are complementarities between buyers' trustworthiness in odd periods and buyers' trustworthiness in even periods. The function (d) is always positive because even if credit shuts down in even periods, it can be sustained in odd periods by the threat of autarky in both odd and even periods. For a given d 0 we de…ne the set of debt limits in odd periods that are consistent with a 2-period cycle by
In Figure 3 the set of credit cycles is the area between and its mirror image with respect to the 45 o line.
Borrowing constraint never binding
Borrowing constraint binding in odd periods
Borrowing constraint binding in even periods There are equilibria where credit dries up periodically. In the left panel of Figure 3 such equilibria correspond to the case where
e., even-period IOUs are believed to be worthless while odd-period IOUs are repaid. If a seller extends a loan in an even period, the buyer defaults, in accordance with equilibrium beliefs, but remains trustworthy in subsequent odd periods. Such outcomes are ruled out by backward induction in pure-currency economies. In contrast a credit economy has IOUs issued at di¤erent dates (and by di¤erent agents), and hence agents can form di¤erent beliefs regarding the terminal value of these di¤erent securities.
The result according to which there are a continuum of equilibria does not imply that everything goes.
Fundamentals, such as preferences and matching technology, do matter for the outcomes that can emerge.
If agents become more patient, i.e., r decreases, then shifts upward, as the discounted sum of future utility ‡ows associated with a given allocation increases, and the set of 2-period cycle equilibria expands.
The expansion of the equilibrium set is represented by the dark yellow area in the left panel of Figure 3 .
Similarly, if the frequency of matches, , increases, then d max increases as permanent autarky entails a larger opportunity cost, and the set of credit cycles expands.
One can generalize the above arguments to T -period cycles, fd j g
. In Figure 4 we represent the set of 3-period cycles for a given d 2 . The outer edge of this set, which has positive measure in R 2 , is represented by a thick black curve. One can also see from the right panel that there is a non-empty set of 3-period cycles (the pink area) where credit shuts down periodically, once (d 2 = 0) or twice (e.g., d 1 = d 2 = 0) every three periods. Also, for our parametrization the …rst best is implementable, i.e., there are equilibria in the purple area with d t d = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; 2g. All these examples show that it is not hard to generate cycles in pure credit economies once one abandons restrictive "not-too-tight" solvency constraints. 
Secular credit growth
Not only can our model explain ‡uctuations in consumption driven by changes in credit conditions, it can also explain the dramatic growth of the share of consumption …nanced with unsecured credit. 24 Indeed, there are PBE equilibria that feature monotone-increasing debt limits and increasing consumption …nanced with unsecured credit. In contrast, under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints fd t g is always weakly monotone decreasing. As an example, suppose that for all t T the debt limit is equal to its maximum, d max . One can think of the economy as maturing at period T in that it achieves the highest level of trust and the highest level of consumption …nanced with unsecured credit. In order to obtain a strictly increasing sequence, we impose
We can iterate until we reach d 0 . Moreover, we can pick d 0 = 0 so at the initial date there is no unsecured credit as agents are not trusted to repay their debt. In subsequent periods debt limits increase over time as buyers become more trustworthy.
Sunspot equilibria with applications to the labor market
We now describe equilibria where individual debt limits are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose that agents are heterogeneous in terms of some state 2 X. We assume that does not a¤ect DM preferences or 
for all 2 X and y = minfy ; 1 (d )g. For any d = hd : 2 Xi, it is straightforward to show that there is a unique vector hV b (d) : 2 Xi that satis…es (17) by the Blackwell su¢ cient condition and the contraction mapping theorem. As before, the lifetime utility of a buyer is the expected discounted sum of the surpluses coming from DM trades. It follows that a sunspot credit equilibrium is a vector, hd ; 2 Xi, that satis…es
We have the following Proposition. 
Extensions
In the following we show that our results regarding the equilibrium set of pure credit economies are robust to trading mechanisms other than take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers. We also extend our model in order to parametrize buyers'temptation to renege on their debt. This assumption plays a key role in GMMW to generate cycles.
DM CM
Seller produces
Buyer consumes and produces y y l (at cost ) l Buyer delivers to seller l B u y e r r e n e g e s a n d c o n s u m e s ( w i t h u t i l i t y ) l l λ Suppose from now on that a buyer who promises to deliver`units of goods in the next CM incurs the linear disutility of producing at the time he is matched in the DM. This new timing is illustrated in Figure   5 . 25 The e¤ort exerted by the buyer in the DM,`, is perfectly observable to the seller. At the time of delivery, at the beginning of the CM, the disutility of production has been sunk and the buyer has the option to renege on his promise to deliver the good. The buyer's utility from consuming his own output is `with
1.
A buyer has no incentive to produce more output than the amount he promises to repay to the seller since the net utility gain from producing x units of the good for oneself is ( 1)x 0. Although the physical environment is di¤erent, mathematically speaking, the model of the previous section can be 2 5 The description of the buyer's incentive problem is taken from GMMW.
regarded as a special case with = 1. As before we will focus on symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria that satisfy (A1)-(A3). 26 Let f(d t ; y t ;`t)g 
where the relationship between y t ,`t, and d t will depend on the assumed trading mechanism.
Bargaining
It is standard in the literature on markets with pairwise meetings to determine the outcome of a meeting by an axiomatic bargaining solution. In this section we consider the generalized Nash solution. 27 We adopt the representation of the equilibrium with solvency constraints,`t d t , in order to obtain a convex bargaining set. 28 For a given sequence of debt limits, fd t g +1 t=0 , the buyer repays minf`t; d t g if his date-t obligation from his DM trade is`t. Due to the linearity of the CM value functions, the buyer's surplus from a DM trade, (y t ;`t) with`t d t , is u(y t ) `t and the seller's surplus is (y t ) +`t. Under generalized Nash bargaining the terms of the loan contract are
The solution is given by
where
A sequence, fd t g +1 t=0 , is a credit equilibrium under generalized Nash bargaining if and only if
2 6 GMMW also introduce an imperfect record-keeping technology as follows. At the end of the CM of period t the repayments are recorded for a subset of buyers, B r t B, chosen at random among all buyers. The set, B r t , of monitored buyers is of measure , and the draws from B are independent across periods. So in every period, while his promise is always recorded, a buyer has a probability of having his repayment decision being recorded. Any equilibrium of our model with < 1 is also an equilibrium with = 1. Hence, setting = 1 is with no loss in generality. 2 7 We also characterized equilibria under the Kalai proportional solution. See our working paper for details. 2 8 Even though the bargaining solution is axiomatic we could consider a simple game where upon being matched the buyer and the seller receive a proposal that they can either accept or reject. The focus here, however, is not on strategic foundations for axiomatic bargaining solutions. where y t is the solution to (20) .
We denoteŷ = arg max fu(y) (y)g the output level that maximizes the buyer's surplus. Unlike the proportional solutionŷ < y for all < 1. As a result the buyer's surplus, u(y) (y), in the right side of the participation constraint, (22) , is non-monotonic with the debt limit provided that < 1. 29 It follows that the function (d) is hump-shaped, reaching a maximum at d =d (ŷ) and it is constant for d > (y ).
In Figure 6 we represent the function and the set of pairs, (d 0 ; d 1 ), consistent with a 2-period credit cycle equilibrium. One can see that the results are qualitatively unchanged except for the fact that the credit limits at a periodic equilibrium can be greater than the highest debt limit at a stationary equilibrium. This result will have important normative implications.
The two red stars in the left panel of Figure 6 are the strict two-period cycles under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints that GMMW focuses on. Such cycles are located at the intersection of and its mirror image with respect to the line d 1 = d 0 . It should be clear that the non-monotonicity of the trading mechanism is necessary to obtain such cycles. It can also be checked that cycles under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints do not exist when = 1 (see GMMW). there exists a continuum of PBE 2-period cycles, a fraction of which feature borrowing constraints that bind periodically and a fraction of which have borrowing constraints that bind in all periods.
Competitive pricing
Here we follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ and assume that the terms of the loan contract in the DM are determined by competitive pricing. We reinterpret matching shocks as preference and productivity shocks, i.e., only buyers want to consume and only sellers can produce. As in the previous sections, buyers'repayment strategy follows a threshold rule: for a given sequence of debt limits, fd t g +1 t=0 , the buyer repays minf`t; d t g if his date-t obligation from his DM trade is`t. 30 Moreover, the overall amount of debt issued by a buyer in the DM of period t,`t, is known to all agents. Hence, if p t denotes the price of DM output in terms of the numéraire, the buyer's problem is max y fu(y) p t yg s.t. p t y d t . The solution is
Using that there is the same measure, , of buyers and sellers participating in the market, market clearing implies p t = v 0 (y t ). As a result
otherwise. The buyer's surplus is u(y) py = u(y) 0 (y)y. For a given p, the buyer's surplus is nondecreasing in his borrowing capacity, d t . However, once one takes into account the fact that p = v 0 (y) then the buyer's surplus is non-monotone in his capacity to borrow, d t . Provided that is strictly convex, the buyer's surplus reaches a maximum for y =ŷ < y .
A sequence, fd t g +1 t=0 , is a credit equilibrium under competitive pricing if and only if (22) holds for all t 2 N 0 , where y t is given by
A steady state is a d such that
Under some weak assumptions on v (for example, (y) = 0 (y)y is convex), d max > 0, i.e., there exists a continuum of steady-state equilibria. This also implies that there exist a continuum of strict, 2-period, credit 
Credit cycles and welfare
We now show that the imposition of "not-too-tight" solvency constraints not only reduces drastically the equilibrium set, but it does so by eliminating equilibria with good normative properties. To see this, we consider the set of two-period cycles represented in the left panel of Figure 
In the left panel of Figure   8 we highlight in red and green the set of 2-period cycles, (d 0 ; d 1 ), that dominate the equilibria under "nottoo-tight"solvency constraints (marked by stars). There exist a continuum of such cycles that feature slack participation constraints. Hence, the imposition of "not-too-tight" solvency constraints eliminates good equilibria. The right panel of Figure 8 increases from = 1=6 to = 1=4. There is no credit cycle under the "not-too-tight" solvency constraints, but there are a continuum of PBE cycles where credit constraints are "too-tight" a fraction of which dominate the highest steady state in social welfare.
Generalized Nash bargaining
Price taking 
Conclusion
We have characterized the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of a pure credit economy under We showed that the equilibrium set is much larger than the one obtained under the "not-too-tight" solvency constraints imposed throughout the literature and that the new equilibria are relevant both theoretically and empirically. For instance, we found a continuum of endogenous cycles and sunspot equilibria with credit booms and busts. Some credit cycles are such that credit shuts down periodically and some credit cycles generate larger welfare than stationary equilibria under "not-too-tight" solvency constraints.
There are also equilibria where endogenous debt limits increase over time, consistent with the secular growth of the consumption share …nanced with unsecured credit. Finally, equilibrium outcomes of the pure currency economy are outcomes of the pure credit economy, but the reverse is not true. In summary, imposing
"not-too-tight" solvency constraints in New Monetarist environments entails a severe loss in generality for positive analysis with consequences for normative analysis.
Appendix: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 ()) Here we prove necessity. Suppose that f(y t ; x t ;`t)g 1 t=0 is an equilibrium outcome in a credit equilibrium, (s b ; s s ).
(i) Here we show condition (4) . Because the worst payo¤ to buyers at each period is 0 (autarky) while the equilibrium payo¤ at period t is u(y t ) x t , condition (4) is necessary for buyers to repay their promises at each period.
(ii) To show condition (5), we …rst show that x t = v(y t ) for all t. Note that (A3) implies that x t =`t for all t. If x t < v(y t ), then the seller would not accept the o¤er. Suppose, by contradiction, that x t > v(y t ).
Then, the buyer may deviate and o¤er (y 0 ;`t) with v(y 0 ) 2 (v(y t );`t). Because this deviation does not a¤ect the buyer's public record and the buyer has the same incentive to repay his debt, it is dominant for the seller to accept it. It then is a pro…table deviation because y 0 > y t .
Next, to show that y t y for all t, suppose, by contradiction, that y t > y and hence u(y t ) given as follows. Buyers can be in two states, i;t 2 fG; Ag, and each buyer's initial state is i;0 = G. The law of motion of the buyer i's state are given by:
The strategies are such that s is a credit equilibrium.
Given s b , s s is optimal: the seller expects a buyer in state G to repay up to`t at period t and hence he accepts an o¤er, (y 0 ;`0), if v(y 0 ) minf`0;`tg; with buyers in state A he expects no repayment at all and hence rejects any o¤er. Next, we show that s b is optimal given s s . Consider a buyer with state A at the beginning of period t. Any o¤er to the seller is rejected and therefore it is optimal for the buyer to o¤er (0; 0). Similarly, for such a buyer at the CM stage at period t with a promise`0, his state will remain in A, independent of his repayment decision and hence it is optimal to repay nothing. 
This law of motion is the same as (25) , where d t replaces x t . The strategies are analogous to those constructed in the proof of Proposition 1, but with d t as the maximum amount of debt the buyer repays: at date t, the buyer o¤ers (y t ;`t) in state G, the seller accepts the o¤er (y 0 ;`0) i¤ v(y 0 ) `0 d t and the buyer's state is G, and the buyer repays min(`0; d t ) in the CM in state G if`0 is the loan issued in DM. Following exactly the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, (9) and (10) ensure that (s b ; s s ) is a credit equilibrium.
()) Here we show necessity. Let fd t g 1 t=0 be a sequence consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome, f(y t ; x t ;`t)g 1 t=0 . By de…nition, fd t g 1 t=0 satis…es (10) . To show (9), consider a buyer at period-t CM with a loan size`0 = d t (perhaps on an o¤-equilibrium path). For repayment of d t to be optimal in state G, (9) must hold, i.e., the buyer prefers repaying d t to permanent autarky.
Proof of Corollary 2
Rewrite the incentive-compatibility constraint (11) at time t + 1 and multiply it by to obtain:
Proof of Proposition 3 De…ne the right side of (12) as a function Since in our framework each buyer's future gains from trade and hence his debt limit is unrelated to other buyers, the existence of asymmetric equilibria in which a buyer i's debt limit is such that
follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4
Replace d t = t into the buyer's optimality condition in a monetary economy, (13) , to get
The right side of (32),
with respect to d t+1 . From the strict concavity of the function and the fact that it is equal to 0 when
From (32) and (33),
Iterating (34),
Applying the transversality condition, lim J!1 J d t+J = 0 to (35), we prove that the sequence, fd t g, is a solution to (32) satis…es (9) , and hence it is part of a credit equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
Before the proof proper, we need a lemma about the function (d). 
Fix an element 0 2 X and let X 0 = X f 0 g: De…ne the set Hence, it has a positive Lebesgue measure in R jX 0j and almost all points in it satisfy d 6 = d 0 for all 6 = 0 .
Note that for any hd : 2 X 0 i 2 (d), hd ; 2 Xi with d 0 = d is a sunspot credit equilibrium by (18) .
Applying the transversality condition, lim J!1 J d t+J = 0 to (43), we prove that the sequence, fd t g, solution to (39) satis…es (40), and hence it is part of a credit equilibrium.
This concavity of is satis…ed for the proportional bargaining solution and for the general Nash bargaining solution under the functional forms for u and that guarantee the concavity of the buyer's surplus.
Walrasian pricing Suppose the DM is competitive and p t denotes the price of DM goods in terms of CM goods. In a monetary economy the buyer chooses money holdings as the solution to: From the seller's maximization problem, p t+1 = 0 (y t+1 ) so that f t g solves
It should be noticed that it is the same …rst-order di¤erence equation as the one obtained under buyers' take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Notice, using t+1 = 0 (y t+1 )y t+1 by market-clearing (i.e., m = 1), that t+1 u 0 (y t+1 ) 0 (y t+1 ) 1 = u 0 (y t+1 )y t+1 0 (y t+1 )y t+1 < u(y t+1 ) v 0 (y t+1 )y t+1 ; from the concavity of u. Recall that a su¢ cient condition for the sequence of debt limits to be a credit equilibrium is
This proves that the phase of the monetary equilibrium is located to the left of the phase line of the credit equilibrium. Hence, by the same reasoning as before, any outcome of the monetary economy is an outcome of the credit economy.
